Sentiments Continued:
201
How vastly different are such statements as these from that
expansive goodness of God by which he confers benefits not only on the unworthy, but also
on the evil, the unjust and on those who are deserving of punishment, which trait of
Divine beneficence in our Father who is in heaven, we are commanded to imitate. (Matthew
5:45.)
VIII. Such a doctrine of Predestination is contrary to the nature
of man, in regard to his having been created after the Divine image in the knowledge of
God and in righteousness, in regard to his having been created with freedom of will, and
in regard to his having been created with a disposition and aptitude for the enjoyment of
life eternal. These three circumstance, respecting him, may be deduced from the following
brief expressions: "Do this, and live :" (Romans 10:5 .) "In the day that
thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." (Genesis 2:17.) If man be deprived of
any of these qualifications, such admonitions as these cannot possibly be effective in
exciting him to obedience.
1. This doctrine is inconsistent with the Divine image, which
consists of the knowledge of God and holiness. For according to this knowledge and
righteousness man was qualified and empowered, he was also laid under an obligation to
know God, to love, worship, and serve him. But by the intervention, or rather by the
prevention, of this Predestination, it was pre-ordained that man should be formed vicious
and should commit sin, that is, that he should neither know God, love, worship, nor serve
him; and that he should not perform that which by the image of God, he was well qualified
and empowered to do, and which he was bound to perform. This is tantamount to such a
declaration as the following, which any one might make: "God did undoubtedly create
man after his own image, in righteousness and true holiness; but, notwithstanding this, he
fore-ordained and decreed, that man should become impure and unrighteous, that is, should
be made conformable to the image of Satan."
2. This doctrine is inconsistent with the freedom of the will, in
which and with which man was created by God. For it prevents the exercise of this liberty,
by binding or determining the will absolutely to one object, that is, to do this thing
precisely, or to do that. God, therefore, according to this statement, may be blamed for
the one or the other of these two things,
202
(with which let no man charge his Maker!) either for creating man
with freedom of will, or for hindering him in the use of his own liberty after he had
formed him a free agent. In the former of these two cases, God is chargeable with a want
of consideration, in the latter with mutability. And in both, with being injurious to man
as well as to himself.
3. This Predestination is prejudicial to man in regard to the
inclination and capacity for the eternal fruition of salvation, with which he was endowed
at the period of his creation. For, since by this Predestination it has been
pre-determined, that the greater part of mankind shall not be made partakers of salvation,
but shall fall into everlasting condemnation, and since this predetermination took place
even before the decree had passed for creating man, such persons are deprived of
something, for the desire of which they have been endowed by God with a natural
inclination. This great privation they suffer, not in consequence of any preceding sin or
demerit of their own, but simply and solely through this sort of Predestination.
IX. This Predestination is diametrically opposed to the Act of
Creation.
1. For creation is a communication of good according to the
intrinsic property of its nature. But, creation of this description, whose intent or
design is, to make a way through itself by which the reprobation that had been previously
determined may obtain its object, is not a communication of good. For we ought to form our
estimate and judgment of every good, from the mind and intention of Him who is the Donor,
and from the end to which or on account of which it is bestowed. In the present instance,
the intention of the Donor would have been, to condemn, which is an act that could not
possibly affect any one except a creature; and the end or event of creation would have
been the eternal perdition of the creature. In that case creation would not have been a
communication of any good, but a preparation for the greatest evil both according to the
very intention of the Creator and the actual issue of the matter; and according to the
words of Christ, "it had seen good for that man, if he had never been born!"
(Matthew 26:24.)
2. Reprobation is an act of hatred, and from hatred derives its
origin. But creation does not proceed from hatred; it is not therefore a way or means,
which belongs to the execution of the decree of reprobation.
203
3. Creation is a perfect act of God, by which he has manifested his
wisdom, goodness and omnipotence: It is not therefore subordinate to the end of any other
preceding work or action of God. But it is rather to be viewed as that act of God, which
necessarily precedes and is antecedent to all other acts that he can possibly either
decree or undertake. Unless God had formed a previous conception of the work of creation,
he could not have decreed actually to undertake any other act; and until he had executed
the work of creation, he could by no means have completed any other operation.
4. All the actions of God which tend to the condemnation of his
creatures, are strange work or foreign to him; because God consents to them, for some
other cause that is quite extraneous. But creation is not an action that is foreign to
God, but it is proper to him. It is eminently an action most appropriate to Him, and to
which he could be moved by no other external cause, because it is the very first of the
Divine acts, and, till it was done, nothing could have any actual existence, except God
himself; for every thing else that has a being, came into existence through this action.
5. If creation be the way and means through which God willed the
execution of the decree of his reprobation, he was more inclined to will the act of
reprobation than that of creation; and he consequently derived greater satisfaction from
the act of condemning certain of his innocent creatures, than in the act of their
creation.
6. Lastly. Creation cannot be a way or means of reprobation
according to the absolute purpose of God: because, after the creation was completed, it
was in the power of man still to have remained obedient to the divine commands, and not to
commit sin; to render this possible, while God had on one part bestowed on him sufficient
strength and power, he had also on the other placed sufficient impediments; a circumstance
most diametrically opposed to a Predestination of this description.
X. This doctrine is at open hostility with the Nature of Eternal
Life, and the titles by which it is signally distinguished in the Scriptures. For it is
called "the inheritance of the sons of God ;" (Titus 3:7,) but those alone are
the sons of God, according to the doctrine of the Gospel, "who believe in the name of
Jesus Christ." (John 1:12.) It is also called, "the reward of obedience,"
(Matthew 5:12,) and of "the labor of love;" (Hebrews 6:10,)
204
"the recompense of those who fight the good fight and who run
well, a crown of righteousness," etc. (Revelation 2:10; 2 Timothy 4:7, 8.) God
therefore has not, from his own absolute decree, without any consideration or regard
whatever to faith and obedience, appointed to any man, or determined to appoint to him,
life eternal.
XI This Predestination is also opposed to the Nature of Eternal
Death, and to those appellations by which it is described in Scripture. For it is called
"the wages of sin; (Romans 6:23,) the punishment of everlasting destruction, which
shall be recompensed to them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord
Jesus Christ; (2 Thessalonians 1:8, 9,) the everlasting fire prepared for the devil and
his angels, (Matthew 25:41,) a fire which shall devour the enemies and adversaries of
God." (Hebrews 10:27.) God, therefore, has not, by any absolute decree without
respect to sin and disobedience, prepared eternal death for any person.
XII This Predestination is inconsistent with the Nature and
Properties of Sin in two ways:
1. Because sin is called "disobedience" and
"rebellion," neither of which terms can possibly apply to any person who by a
preceding divine decree is placed under an unavoidable necessity of sinning.
2. Because sin is the meritorious cause of damnation. But the
meritorious cause which moves the Divine will to reprobate, is according to justice; and
it induces God, who holds sin in abhorrence, to will reprobation. Sin, therefore, which is
a cause, cannot be placed among the means, by which God executes the decree or will of
reprobation.
XIII. This doctrine is likewise repugnant to the Nature of Divine
Grace, and as far as its powers permit, it effects its destruction. Under whatever
specious pretenses it may be asserted, that "this kind of Predestination is most
admirably adapted and quite necessary for the establishment of grace," yet it
destroys it in three ways:
1. Because grace is so attempered and commingled with the nature of
man, as not to destroy within him the liberty of his will, but to give it a right
direction, to correct its depravity, and to allow man to possess his own proper notions.
While, on the contrary, this Predestination introduces such a species of grace, as takes
away free will and hinders its exercise.
205
2. Because the representations of grace which the scriptures
contain, are such as describe it capable of "being resisted, (Acts, 7:51,) and
received in vain;" (2 Corinthians 6:1,) and that it is possible for man to avoid
yielding his assent to it; and to refuse all co-operation with it. (Hebrews 12:15; Matthew
23:37; Luke 7:30.) While, on the contrary, this Predestination affirms, that grace is a
certain irresistible force and operation.
3. Because, according to the primary intention and chief design of
God, grace conduces to the good of those persons to whom it is offered and by whom it is
received: while, on the contrary, this doctrine drags along with it the assertion, that
grace is offered even to certain reprobates, and is so far communicated to them as to
illuminate their understandings and to excite within them a taste for the heavenly gifts,
only for this end and purpose, that, in proportion to the height to which they are
elevated, the abyss into which they are precipitated may be the deeper, and their fall the
heavier; and that they may both merit and receive the greater perdition.
XIV. The doctrine of this Predestination is Injurious to the Glory
of God, which does not consist of a declaration of liberty or authority, nor of a
demonstration of anger and power, except to such an extent as that declaration and
demonstration may be consistent with justice, and with a perpetual reservation in behalf
of the honor of God’s goodness. But, according to this doctrine, it follows that God
is the author of sin, which may be proved by four arguments:
1. One of its positions is, that God has absolutely decreed to
demonstrate his glory by punitive justice and mercy, in the salvation of some men, and in
the damnation of others, which neither was done, nor could have possibly been done, unless
sin had entered into the world.
2. This doctrine affirms, that, in order to obtain his object, God
ordained that man should commit sin, and be rendered vitiated; and, from this Divine
ordination or appointment, the fall of man necessarily followed.
3. It asserts that God has denied to man, or has withdrawn from
him, such a portion of grace as is sufficient and necessary to enable him to avoid sin,
and that this was done before man had sinned: which is an act that amounts to the same as
if God had prescribed a law to man, which it
206
would be utterly impossible for him to fulfill, when the nature in
which he had been created was taken into consideration.
4. It ascribes to God certain operations with regard to man, both
external and internal, both mediate (by means of the intervention of other creatures) and
immediate — which Divine operations being once admitted, man must necessarily commit
sin, by that necessity which the schoolmen call "a consequential necessity antecedent
to the thing itself," and which totally destroys the freedom of the will. Such an act
does this doctrine attribute to God, and represents it to proceed from his primary and
chief intention, without any foreknowledge of an inclination, will, or action on the part
of man.
From these premises, we deduce, as a further conclusion, that God
really sins. Because, according to this doctrine, he moves to sin by an act that is
unavoidable, and according to his own purpose and primary intention, without having
received any previous inducement to such an act from any preceding sin or demerit in man.
From the same position we might also infer, that God is the only
sinner. For man, who is impelled by an irresistible force to commit sin, (that is, to
perpetrate some deed that has been prohibited,) cannot be said to sin himself.
As a legitimate consequence it also follows, that sin is not sin,
since whatever that be which God does, it neither can be sin, nor ought any of his acts to
receive that appellation.
Besides the instances which I have already recounted, there is
another method by which this doctrine inflicts a deep wound on the honor of God — but
these, it is probable, will be considered at present to be amply sufficient.
XV. This doctrine is highly dishonorable to Jesus Christ our
Savior. For,
1. It entirely excludes him from that decree of Predestination
which predestinates the end: and it affirms, that men were predestinated to be saved,
before Christ was predestinated to save them; and thus it argues, that he is not the
foundation of election. 207
2. It denies, that Christ is the meritorious cause, that again
obtained for us the salvation which we had lost, by placing him as only a subordinate
cause of that salvation which had been already foreordained, and thus only a minister and
instrument to apply that salvation unto us. This indeed is in evident congruity with the
opinion which states "that God has absolutely willed the salvation of certain men, by
the first and supreme decree which he passed, and on which all his other decrees depend
and are consequent." If this be true, it was therefore impossible for the salvation
of such men to have been lost, and therefore unnecessary for it to be repaired and in some
sort regained afresh, and discovered, by the merit of Christ, who was fore-ordained a
Savior for them alone.
XVI. This doctrine is also hurtful to the salvation of men.
1. Because it prevents that saving and godly sorrow for sins that
have been committed, which cannot exist in those who have no consciousness of sin. But it
is obvious, that the man who has committed sin through the unavoidable necessity of the
decree of God, cannot possibly have this kind of consciousness of sin. (2 Corinthians
7:10.)
2. Because it removes all pious solicitude about being converted
from sin unto God. For he can feel no such concern who is entirely passive and conducts
himself like a dead man, with respect not only to his discernment and perception of the
grace of God that is exciting and assisting, but also to his assent and obedience to it;
and who is converted by such an irresistible impulse, that he not only cannot avoid being
sensible of the grace of God which knocks within him, but he must likewise of necessity
yield his assent to it, and thus convert himself, or rather be converted. Such a person it
is evident, cannot produce within his heart or conceive in his mind this solicitude,
except he have previously felt the same irresistible motion. And if he should produce
within his heart any such concern, it would be in vain and without the least advantage.
For that cannot be a true solicitude, which is not produced in the heart by any other
means except by an irresistible force according to the absolute purpose and intention of
God to effect his salvation. (Revelation 2:3; 3:2.)
3. Because it restrains, in persons that are converted, all zeal
and studious regard for good works, since it declares "that the regenerate cannot
perform either more or less good than they do." For he that is actuated or impelled
208
by saving grace, must work, and cannot discontinue his labor; but
he that is not actuated by the same grace, can do nothing, and finds it necessary to cease
from all attempts. (Titus 3:14.)
4. Because it extinguishes the zeal for prayer, which yet is an
efficacious means instituted by God for asking and obtaining all kinds of blessings from
him, but principally the great one of salvation. (Luke 11:1-13.) But from the circumstance
of it having been before determined by an immutable and inevitable decree, that this
description of men [the elect] should obtain salvation, prayer cannot on any account be a
means for asking and obtaining that salvation. It can only be a mode of worshipping God;
because according to the absolute decree of his Predestination he has determined that such
men shall be saved.
5. It takes away all that most salutary fear and trembling with
which we are commanded to work out our own salvation. (Philippians 2:12) for it states
"that he who is elected and believes, cannot sin with that full and entire
willingness with which sin is committed by the ungodly; and that they cannot either
totally or finally fall away from faith or grace."
6. Because it produces within men a despair both of performing that
which their duty requires and of obtaining that towards which their desires are directed.
For when they are taught that the grace of God (which is really necessary to the
performance of the least portion of good) is denied to the majority of mankind, according
to an absolute and peremptory decree of God — — and that such grace is denied
because, by a preceding decree equally absolute, God has determined not to confer
salvation on them but damnation; when they are thus taught, it is scarcely possible for
any other result to ensue, than that the individual who cannot even with great difficulty
work a persuasion within himself of his being elected, should soon consider himself
included in the number of the reprobate. From such an apprehension as this, must arise a
certain despair of performing righteousness and obtaining salvation.
XVII. This doctrine inverts the order of the Gospel of Jesus
Christ. For in the Gospel God requires repentance and faith on the part of man, by
promising to him life everlasting, if he consent to become a convert and a believer. (Mark
1:15; 16:16.) But it is stated in this [Supralapsarian] decree of Predestination, that it
is God’s absolute will, to bestow salvation on
209
certain particular men, and that he willed at the same time
absolutely to give those very individuals repentance and faith, by means of an
irresistible force, because it was his will and pleasure to save them. In the Gospel, God
denounces eternal death on the impenitent and unbelieving. (John 3:36.) And those threats
contribute to the purpose which he has in view, that he may by such means deter them from
unbelief and thus may save them. But by this decree of Predestination it is taught, that
God wills not to confer on certain individual men that grace which is necessary for
conversion and faith because he has absolutely decreed their condemnation.
The Gospel says,
"God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten son,
that whosoever believeth in him should have everlasting life." (John 3:16.) But this
doctrine declares; "that God so loved those whom he had absolutely elected to eternal
life, as to give his son to them alone, and by an irresistible force to produce within
them faith on him." To embrace the whole in few words, the Gospel says, "fulfill
the command, and thou shalt obtain the promise; believe, and thou shalt live." But
this [supralapsarian] doctrine says, "since it is my will to give thee life, it is
therefore my will to give thee faith:" which is a real and most manifest inversion of
the Gospel.
XVIII. This Predestination is in open hostility to the ministry of
the Gospel.
1. For if God by an irresistible power quicken him who is dead in
trespasses and sins, no man can be a minister and "a laborer together with God,"
(1 Corinthians 3:9,) nor can the word preached by man be the instrument of grace and of
the Spirit, any more than a creature could have been an instrument of grace in the first
creation, or a dispenser of that grace in the resurrection of the body from the dead.
2. Because by this Predestination the ministry of the gospel is
made "the savor of death unto death" in the case of the majority of those who
hear it, (2 Corinthians 2:14-16,) as well as an instrument of condemnation, according to
the primary design and absolute intention of God, without any consideration of previous
rebellion.
3. Because, according to this doctrine, baptism, when administered
to many reprobate children, (who yet are the offspring of parents that believe and are
God’s covenant people,) is evidently a seal [or ratification] of
210
nothing, and thus becomes entirely useless, in accordance with the
primary and absolute intention of God, without any fault [or culpability] on the part of
the infants themselves, to whom it is administered in obedience to the Divine command.
4. Because it hinders public prayers from being offered to God in a
becoming and suitable manner, that is, with faith, and in confidence that they will be
profitable to all the hearers of the word; when there are many among them, whom God is not
only unwilling to save, but whom by his absolute, eternal, and immutable will, (which is
antecedent to all things and causes whatever,) it is his will and pleasure to damn: In the
mean time, when the apostle commands prayers and supplications to be made for all men, he
adds this reason,
"for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our
Savior; who will have all men to be saved,
and to come unto the knowledge of the truth." (1 Timothy
2:1-4.)
5. The constitution of this doctrine is such, as very easily to
render pastors and teachers slothful and negligent in the exercise of their ministry:
Because, from this doctrine it appears to them as though it were impossible for all their
diligence to be useful to any persons, except to those only whom God absolutely and
precisely wills to save, and who cannot possibly perish; and as though all their
negligence could be hurtful to none, except to those alone whom God absolutely wills to
destroy, who must of necessity perish, and to whom a contrary fate is impossible.
XIX. This doctrine completely subverts the foundation of religion
in general, and of the Christian Religion in particular.
1. The foundation of religion considered in general, is a two-fold
love of God; without which there neither is nor can be any religion: The first of them is
a love for righteousness [or justice] which gives existence to his hatred of sin. The
second is a love for the creature who is endowed with reason, and (in the matter now
before us,) it is a love for man, according to the expression of the Apostle to the
Hebrews. "for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a
rewarder of them that diligently seek Him." (11:6.) God’s love of righteousness
is manifested by this circumstance, that it is not his will and pleasure to bestow eternal
life on
211
any except on "those who seek him." God’s love of
man consists in his being willing to give him eternal life, if he seek Him.
A mutual relation subsists between these two kinds of love, which
is this. The latter species of love, which extends itself to the creatures, cannot come
into exercise, except so far as it is permitted by the former, [the love of
righteousness]: The former love, therefore, is by far the most excellent species; but in
every direction there is abundant scope for the emanations of the latter, [the love of the
creature,] except where the former [the love of righteousness] has placed some impediment
in the range of its exercise. The first of these consequences is most evidently proved
from the circumstance of God’s condemning man on account of sin, although he loves
him in the relation in which he stands as his creature; which would by no means have been
done, had he loved man more than righteousness, [or justice,] and had he evinced a
stronger aversion to the eternal misery of man than to his disobedience. But the second
consequence is proved by this argument, that God condemns no person, except on account of
sin; and that he saves such a multitude of men who turn themselves away [or are converted]
from sin; which he could not do, unless it was his will to allow as abundant scope to his
love for the creatures, as is permitted by righteousness [or justice] under the regulation
of the Divine judgment.
But this [Supralapsarian] doctrine inverts this order and mutual
relation in two ways:
(1.) The one is when it states, that God wills absolutely to save
certain particular men, without having had in that his intention the least reference or
regard to their obedience. This is the manner in which it places the love of God to man
before his love of righteousness, and lays down the position — that God loves men (as
such) more than righteousness, and evinces a stronger aversion to their misery than to
their sin and disobedience.
(2.) The other is when it asserts, on the contrary, that God wills
absolutely to damn certain particular men without manifesting in his decree any
consideration of their disobedience. In this manner it detracts from his love to the
creature that which belongs to it; while it teaches, that God hates the creature, without
any cause or necessity derived from his love of
212
righteousness and his hatred of iniquity. In which case, it is not
true, "that sin is the primary object of God’s hatred, and its only meritorious
cause." The great influence and potency which this consideration possesses in
subverting the foundation of religion, may be appropriately described by the following
simile: Suppose a son to say, "My father is such a great lover of righteousness and
equity, that, notwithstanding I am his beloved son, he would disinherit me if I were found
disobedient to him. Obedience, therefore, is a duty which I must sedulously cultivate, and
which is highly incumbent upon me, if I wish to be his heir." Suppose another son to
say: "My father’s love for me is so great, that he is absolutely resolved to
make me his heir. There is, therefore, no necessity for my earnestly striving to yield him
obedience; for, according to his unchangeable will, I shall become his heir. Nay, he will
by an irresistible force draw me to obey him, rather than not suffer me to be made his
heir." But such reasoning as the latter is diametrically opposed to the doctrine
contained in the following words of John the Baptist:
"And think not to say within yourselves, we have Abraham to
our father: For I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto
Abraham." (Matthew 3:9.)
2. But the Christian religion also has its superstructure built
upon this two-fold love as a foundation. This love, however, is to be considered in a
manner somewhat different, in consequence of the change in the condition of man, who, when
he had been created after the image of God and in his favor, became by his own fault a
sinner and an enemy to God.
(1.) God’s love of righteousness [or justice] on which the
Christian religion rests, is, first, that righteousness which he declared only once, which
was in Christ; because it was his will that sin should not be expiated in any other way
than by the blood and death of his Son, and that Christ should not be admitted before him
as an Advocate, Deprecator and Intercessor, except when sprinkled by his own blood. But
this love of righteousness is, secondly, that which he daily manifests in the preaching of
the gospel, in which he declares it to be his will to grant a communication of Christ and
his benefits to no man, except to him who becomes converted and believes in Christ.
213
(2.) God’s love of miserable sinners, on which likewise the
Christian religion is founded, is, first, that love by which he gave his Son for them, and
constituted him a Savior of those who obey him. But this love of sinners is, secondly,
that by which he hath required obedience, not according to the rigor and severity to which
he was entitled by his own supreme right, but according to his grace and clemency, and
with the addition of a promise of the remission of sins, provided fallen man repent. The
[supralapsarian] doctrine of Predestination is, in two ways, opposed to this two-fold
foundation: first, by stating, "that God has such a great love for certain sinners,
that it was his will absolutely to save them before he had given satisfaction, through
Christ Jesus, to his love of righteousness, [or justice,] and that he thus willed their
salvation even in his own fore-knowledge and according to his determinate purpose."
Besides, it totally and most completely overturns this foundation,
by teaching it to be "God’s pleasure, that satisfaction should be paid to his
justice, [or righteousness,] because he willed absolutely to save such persons:"
which is nothing less, than to make his love for justice, manifested in Christ,
subordinate to his love for sinful man whom it is his will absolutely to save. Secondly.
It opposes itself to this foundation, by teaching, "that it is the will of God
absolutely to damn certain sinners without any consideration of their impenitency;"
when at the same time a most plenary and complete satisfaction had been rendered, in
Christ Jesus, to God’s love of righteousness [or justice] and to his hatred of sin.
So that nothing now can hinder the possibility of his extending mercy to the sinner,
whosoever he may be, except the condition of repentance. Unless some person should choose
to assert, what is stated in this doctrine, "that it has been God’s will to act
towards the greater part of mankind with the same severity as he exercised towards the
devil and his angels, or even with greater, since it was his pleasure that neither Christ
nor his gospel should be productive of greater blessings to them than to the devils, and
since, according to the first offense, the door of grace is as much closed against them as
it is against the evil angels." Yet each of those angels sinned, by himself in his
own proper person, through his individual maliciousness, and by his voluntary act; while
men sinned, only in Adam their parent, before they had been brought into existence.
214
But, that we may more clearly understand the fact of this two-fold
love being the foundation of all religion and the manner in which it is so, with the
mutual correspondence that subsists between each other, as we have already described them,
it will be profitable for us to contemplate with greater attention the following words of
the Apostle to the Hebrews: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is and that
He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him." In these words two things are
laid down as foundations to religion, in opposition to two fiery darts of Satan, which are
the most pernicious pests to it, and each of which is able by itself to overturn and
extirpate all religion. One of them is security, the other despair. Security operates,
when a man permits himself, that, how inattentive soever he may be to the worship of God,
he will not be damned, but will obtain salvation. Despair is in operation, when a person
entertains a persuasion, that, whatever degree of reverence he may evince towards God, he
will not receive any remuneration. In what human mind soever either of these pests is
fostered, it is impossible that any true and proper worship of God can there reside. Now
both of them are overturned by the words of the Apostle: For if a man firmly believes,
"that God will bestow eternal life on those alone who seek Him, but that He will
inflict on the rest death eternal," he can on no account indulge himself in security.
And if he likewise believes, that "God is truly a rewarder of those who diligently
seek Him," by applying himself to the search he will not be in danger of falling into
despair. The foundation of the former kind of faith by which a man firmly believes,
"that God will bestow eternal life on none except on those who seek Him," is
that love which God bears to his own righteousness, [or justice,] and which is greater
than that which he entertains for man. And, by this alone, all cause of security is
removed. But the foundation of the latter kind of faith, "that God will undoubtedly
be a rewarder of those who diligently seek Him," is that great love for man which
neither will nor can prevent God from effecting salvation for him, except he be hindered
by his still greater love for righteousness or justice. Yet the latter kind of love is so
far from operating as a hindrance to God from becoming a rewarder of those who diligently
seek Him, that on the contrary, it promotes in every possible way the bestowment of that
reward. Those persons, therefore, who seek God, can by no means indulge in a single doubt
concerning his readiness to remunerate. And it is this which acts as a preservative
against despair or distrust. Since this is the
215
actual state of the case, this two-fold love, and the mutual
relation which each part of it bears to the other and which we have just unfolded, are the
foundations of religion, without which no religion can possibly exist. That doctrine,
therefore, which is in open hostility to this mutual love and to the relation that
mutually subsists between them, is, at the same time, subversive of the foundation of all
religion.
XX. Lastly. This doctrine of Predestination has been rejected both
in former times and in our own days, by the greater part of the professors of
Christianity.
1. But, omitting all mention of the periods that occurred in former
ages, facts themselves declare, that the Lutheran and Anabaptist Churches, as well as that
of Rome, account this to be an erroneous doctrine.
2. However highly Luther and Melancthon might at the very
commencement of the reformation, have approved of this doctrine, they afterwards deserted
it. This change in Melancthon is quite apparent from his latter writings: And those who
style themselves "Luther’s disciples," make the same statement respecting
their master, while they contend that on this subject he made a more distinct and copious
declaration of his sentiments, instead of entirely abandoning those which he formerly
entertained. But Philip Melancthon believed that this doctrine did not differ greatly from
the fate of the Stoics: This appears from many of his writings, but more particularly in a
certain letter which he addressed to Gasper Peucer, and in which, among other things, he
states: "Laelius writes to me and says, that the controversy respecting the Stoical
Fate is agitated with such uncommon fervor at Geneva, that one individual is cast into
prison because he happened to differ from Zeno. O unhappy times! When the doctrine of
salvation is thus obscured by certain strange disputes!"
3. All the Danish Churches embrace a doctrine quite opposed to
this, as is obvious from the writings of Nicholas Hemmingius in his treatise on Universal
Grace, in which he declares that the contest between him and his adversaries consisted in
the determination of these two points: "do the Elect believe ," or, "are
believers the true elect?" He considers "those persons who maintain the former
position, to hold sentiments agreeable to the doctrine of the Manichees and Stoics; and
those who maintain the
216
latter point, are in obvious agreement with Moses and the Prophets,
with Christ and his Apostles."
4. Besides, by many of the inhabitants of these our own provinces,
this doctrine is accounted a grievance of such a nature, as to cause several of them to
affirm, that on account of it, they neither can nor will have any communion with our
Church. Others of them have united themselves with our Churches, but not without entering
a protest, "that they cannot possibly give their consent to this doctrine." But,
on account of this kind of Predestination, our Churches have been deserted by not a few
individuals, who formerly held the same opinions as ourselves: Others, also, have
threatened to depart from us, unless they be fully assured that the Church holds no
opinion of this description.
5. There is likewise no point of doctrine which the Papists,
Anabaptists, and Lutherans oppose with greater vehemence than this, and through whose
sides they create a worse opinion of our Churches or procure for them a greater portion of
hatred, and thus bring into disrepute all the doctrines which we profess. They likewise
affirm "that of all the blasphemies against God which the mind of man can conceive or
his tongue can express, there is none so foul as not to be deduced by fair consequence
from this opinion of our doctors."
6. Lastly. Of all the difficulties and controversies which have
arisen in these our Churches since the time of the Reformation, there is none that has not
had its origin in this doctrine, or that has not, at least, been mixed with it. What I
have here said will be found true, if we bring to our recollection the controversies which
existed at Leyden in the affair of Koolhaes, at Gouda in that of Herman Herberts, at Horn
with respect to Cornelius Wiggerston, and at Mendenblich in the affair of Tako Sybrants.
This consideration was not among the last of those motives which induced me to give my
most diligent attention to this head of doctrine, and endeavor to prevent our Churches
from suffering any detriment from it; because, from it, the Papists have derived much of
their increase. While all pious teachers ought most heartily to desire the destruction of
Popery, as they would that of the kingdom of Antichrist, they ought with the greatest
zeal, to engage in the attempt, and as far as it is within their power, to make the most
efficient preparations for its overthrow.
217
The preceding views are, in brief, those which I hold respecting
this novel doctrine of Predestination. I have propounded it with all good faith from the
very expressions of the authors themselves, that I might not seem to invent and attribute
to them any thing which I was not able clearly to prove from their writings.
3. A SECOND KIND OF PREDESTINATION.
But some other of our doctors state the subject of God’s
Predestination in a manner somewhat different. We will cursorily touch upon the two modes
which they employ.
Among some of them the following opinion is prevalent:
1. God determined within himself, by an eternal and immutable
decree, to make (according to his own good pleasure,) the smaller portion out of the
general mass of mankind partakers of his grace and glory, to the praise of his own
glorious grace. But according to his pleasure he also passed by the greater portion of
men, and left them in their own nature, which is incapable of every thing supernatural,
[or beyond itself,] and did not communicate to them that saving and supernatural grace by
which their nature, (if it still retained its integrity,) might be strengthened, or by
which, if it were corrupted, it might be restored — for a demonstration of his own
liberty. Yet after God had made these men sinners and guilty of death, he punished them
with death eternal — for a demonstration of his own justice.
2. Predestination is to be considered in respect to its end and to
the means which tend to it. But these persons employ the word "Predestination"
in its special acceptation for election and oppose it to reprobation.
(1.) In respect to its end, (which is salvation, and an
illustration of the glorious grace of God,) man is considered in common and absolutely,
such as he is in his own nature.
(2.) But in respect to the means, man is considered as perishing
from himself and in himself, and as guilty in Adam.
3. In the decree concerning the end, the following
gradations are to be regarded.
Next
Back to top
