Sentiments Continued
218
(1.) The prescience of God, by which he foreknew those whom he had
predestinated. Then
(2.) The Divine prefinition, [or predetermination,] by which he
foreordained the salvation of those persons by whom he had foreknown.
First, by electing them from all eternity: and secondly, by
preparing for them grace in this life, and glory in the world to come.
4. The means which belong to the execution of this Predestination,
are
(1.) Christ himself:
(2.) An efficacious call to faith in Christ, from which
justification takes its origin:
(3.) The gift of perseverance unto the end.
5. As far as we are capable of comprehending their scheme of
reprobation it consists of two acts, that of preterition and that of predamnatian. It is
antecedent to all things, and to all causes which are either in the things themselves or
which arise out of them; that is, it has no regard whatever to any sin, and only views man
in an absolute and general aspect.
6. Two means are fore-ordained for the execution of the act of
preterition:
(1.) Dereliction [or abandoning] in a state of nature, which by
itself is incapable of every thing supernatural: and
(2.) Non-communication [or a negation] of supernatural grace, by
which their nature (if in a state of integrity,) might be strengthened, and (if in a state
of corruption,) might be restored.
7. Predamnation is antecedent to all things, yet it does by no
means exist without a fore-knowledge of the causes of damnation. It views man as a sinner,
obnoxious to damnation in Adam, and as on this account perishing through the necessity of
Divine justice.
8. The means ordained for the execution of this predamnation, are
(1.) Just desertion, which is either that of exploration, [or
examination,] in which God does not confer his grace, or that of punishment when God
219
takes away from a man all his saving gifts, and delivers him over
to the power of Satan.
(2.) The second means are induration or hardening, and those
consequences which usually follow even to the real damnation of the person reprobated.
4. A THIRD KIND OF PREDESTINATION.
But others among our doctors state their sentiments on this subject
in the following manner:
1. Because God willed within himself from all eternity to make a
decree by which he might elect certain men and reprobate the rest, he viewed and
considered the human race not only as created but likewise as fallen or corrupt, and on
that account obnoxious to cursing and malediction. Out of this lapsed and accursed state
God determined to liberate certain individuals and freely to save them by his grace, for a
declaration of his mercy; but he resolved in his own just judgment to leave the rest under
the curse [or malediction] for a declaration of his justice. In both these cases God acts
without the least consideration of repentance and faith in those whom he elects, or of
impenitence and unbelief in those whom he reprobates.
2. The special means which relate particularly to the execution
both of election and reprobation, are the very same as those which we have already
expounded in the first of these kinds of Predestination, with the exception of those means
which are common both to election and reprobation; because this [third] opinion places the
fall of man, not as a means fore-ordained for the execution of the preceding decree of
Predestination, but as something that might furnish a fixed purpose or occasion for making
this decree of Predestination.
5. MY JUDGMENT RESPECTING THE TWO LAST DESCRIBED SCHEMES OF
PREDESTINATION.
Both these opinions, as they outwardly pretend, differ from the
first in this point — that neither of them lays down the creation or the fall as a
mediate cause fore-ordained by God for the execution of the preceding decree of
Predestination. Yet, with regard to the fall, some diversity may
220
be perceived in the two latter opinions. For the second kind of
Predestination places election, with regard to the end, before the fall; it also places
before that event preterition, [or passing by,] which is the first part of reprobation.
While the third kind does not allow any part of election and reprobation to commence till
after the fall of man. But, among the causes which seem to have induced the inventors of
the two latter schemes to deliver the doctrine of Predestination in this manner, and not
to ascend to such a great height as the inventors of the first scheme have done, this is
not the least — that they have been desirous of using the greatest precaution, lest
it might be concluded from their doctrine that God is the author of sin, with as much show
of probability as, (according to the intimation of some of those who yield their assent to
both the latter kinds,) it is deducible from the first description of Predestination.
Yet if we be willing to inspect these two latter opinions a little
more closely, and in particular if we accurately examine the second and third kind and
compare them with other sentiments of the same author concerning some subjects of our
religion, we shall discover, that the fall of Adam cannot possibly, according to their
views, be considered in any other manner than as a necessary means for the execution of
the preceding decree of Predestination.
1. In reference to the second of the three, this is apparent from
two reasons comprised in it:
The first of these reasons is that which states God to have
determined by the decree of reprobation to deny to man that grace which was necessary for
the confirmation and strengthening of his nature, that it might not be corrupted by sin;
which amounts to this, that God decreed not to bestow that grace which was necessary to
avoid sin; and from this must necessarily follow the transgression of man, as proceeding
from a law imposed on him. The fall of man is therefore a means ordained for the execution
of the decree of reprobation.
The second of these reasons is that which states the two parts of
reprobation to be preterition and predamnation. These two parts, according to that decree,
are connected together by a necessary and mutual bond, and are equally extensive. For, all
those whom God passed by in conferring Divine grace, are likewise damned. Indeed no others
are damned,
221
except those who are the subjects of this act of preterition. From
this therefore it may be concluded, that "sin must necessarily follow from the decree
of reprobation or preterition, because, if it were otherwise, it might possibly happen,
that a person who had been passed by, might not commit sin, and from that circumstance
might not become liable to damnation; since sin is the sole meritorious cause of
damnation: and thus certain of those individuals who had been passed by, might neither be
saved nor damned — which is great absurdity.
This second opinion on Predestination, therefore, falls into the
same inconvenience as the first. For it not only does not avoid that [conclusion of making
God the author of sin,] but while those who profess it make the attempt, they fall into a
palpable and absurd self-contradiction — while, in reference to this point, the first
of these opinions is alike throughout and consistent with itself.
2. The third of these schemes of Predestination would escape this
rock to much better effect, did not the patrons of it, while declaring their sentiments on
Predestination and providence, employ certain expressions, from which the necessity of the
fall might be deduced. Yet this necessity cannot possibly have any other origin than some
degree of Predestination.
(1.) One of these explanatory expressions is their description of
the Divine permission, by which God permits sin. Some of them describe it thus:
"permission is the withdrawing of that Divine grace, by which, when God executes the
decrees of his will through rational creatures, he either does not reveal to the creature
that divine will of his own by which he wills that action to be performed, or does not
bend the will of the creature to yield obedience in that act to the Divine will." To
these expressions, the following are immediately subjoined: "if this be a correct
statement, the creature commits sin through necessity, yet voluntarily and without
restraint." If it be objected that "this description does not comport with that
permission by which God permitted the sin of Adam:" We also entertain the same
opinion about it. Yet it follows, as a consequence, from this very description, that
"other sins are committed through necessity."
(2.) Of a similar tendency are the expressions which some of them
use, when they contend, that the declaration of the glory of God, which must necessarily
be illustrated, is placed in "the demonstration of mercy and of
222
punitive justice." But such a demonstration could not have
been made, unless sin, and misery through sin, had entered into the world, to form at
least some degree of misery for the least sin. And in this manner is sin also necessarily
introduced, through the necessity of such a demonstration of the Divine glory. Since the
fall of Adam is already laid down to be necessary, and, on that account, to be a means for
executing the preceding decree of Predestination; creation itself is likewise at the same
time laid down as a means subservient to the execution of the same decree. For the fall
cannot be necessarily consequent upon the creation, except through the decree of
Predestination, which cannot be placed between the creation and the fall, but is prefixed
to both of them, as having the precedence, and ordaining creation for the fall, and both
of them for executing one and the same decree — to demonstrate the justice of God in
the punishment of sin, and his mercy in its remission. Because, if this were not the case,
that which must necessarily ensue from the act of creation had not seen intended by God
when he created, which is to suppose an impossibility. But let it be granted, that the
necessity of the fall of Adam cannot be deduced from either of the two latter opinions,
yet all the preceding arguments which have been produced against the first opinion, are,
after a trifling modification to suit the varied purpose, equally valid against the two
latter. This would be very apparent, if, to demonstrate it, a conference were to be
instituted.
6. MY OWN SENTIMENTS ON PREDESTINATION.
I have hitherto been stating those opinions concerning the article
of Predestination which are inculcated in our Churches and in the University of Leyden,
and of which I disapprove. I have at the same time produced my own reasons, why I form
such an unfavorable judgment concerning them; and I will now declare my own opinions on
this subject, which are of such a description as, according to my views, appear most
conformable to the word of God.
1. The first absolute decree of God concerning the salvation of
sinful man, is that by which he decreed to appoint his Son, Jesus Christ, for a Mediator,
Redeemer, Savior, Priest and King, who might destroy sin by
223
his own death, might by his obedience obtain the salvation which
had been lost, and might communicate it by his own virtue.
2. The second precise and absolute decree of God, is that in which
he decreed to receive into favor those who repent and believe, and, in Christ, for his
sake and through Him, to effect the salvation of such penitents and believers as
persevered to the end; but to leave in sin, and under wrath, all impenitent persons and
unbelievers, and to damn them as aliens from Christ.
3. The third Divine decree is that by which God decreed to
administer in a sufficient and efficacious manner the means which were necessary for
repentance and faith; and to have such administration instituted
(1.) according to the Divine Wisdom, by which God knows what is
proper and becoming both to his mercy and his severity, and
(2.) according to Divine Justice, by which He is prepared to adopt
whatever his wisdom may prescribe and put it in execution.
4. To these succeeds the fourth decree, by which God decreed to
save and damn certain particular persons. This decree has its foundation in the
foreknowledge of God, by which he knew from all eternity those individuals who would,
through his preventing grace, believe, and, through his subsequent grace would persevere,
according to the before described administration of those means which are suitable and
proper for conversion and faith; and, by which foreknowledge, he likewise knew those who
would not believe and persevere.
Predestination, when thus explained, is
1. The foundation of Christianity, and of salvation and its
certainty.
2. It is the sum and the matter of the gospel; nay, it is the
gospel itself, and on that account necessary to be believed in order to salvation, as far
as the two first articles are concerned.
3. It has had no need of being examined or determined by any
council, either general or particular, since it is contained in the scriptures clearly and
expressly in so many words; and no contradiction has ever yet been offered to it by any
orthodox Divine.
224
4. It has constantly been acknowledged and taught by all Christian
teachers who held correct and orthodox sentiments.
5. It agrees with that harmony of all confessions, which has been
published by the protestant Churches.
6. It likewise agrees most excellently with the Dutch Confession
and Catechism. This concord is such, that if in the Sixteenth article these two
expressions "those persons whom" and "others," be explained by the
words "believers" and "unbelievers" these opinions of mine on
Predestination will be comprehended in that article with the greatest clearness. This is
the reason why I directed the thesis to be composed in the very words of the Confession,
when, on one occasion, I had to hold a public disputation before my private class in the
University. This kind of Predestination also agrees with the reasoning contained in the
twentieth and the fifty-fourth question of the Catechism.
7. It is also in excellent accordance with the nature of God —
with his wisdom, goodness, and righteousness; because it contains the principal matter of
all of them, and is the clearest demonstration of the Divine wisdom, goodness, and
righteousness [or justice]
8. It is agreeable in every point with the nature of man — in
what form soever that nature may be contemplated, whether in the primitive state of
creation, in that of the fall, or in that of restoration.
9. It is in complete concert with the act of creation, by affirming
that the creation itself is a real communication of good, both from the intention of God,
and with regard to the very end or event; that it had its origin in the goodness of God;
that whatever has a reference to its continuance and preservation, proceeds from Divine
love; and that this act of creation is a perfect and appropriate work of God, in which he
is at complaisance with himself, and by which he obtained all things necessary for an
unsinning state.
10. It agrees with the nature of life eternal, and with the
honorable titles by which that life is designated in the scriptures.
11. It also agrees with the nature of death eternal, and with the
names by which that death is distinguished in scripture.
225
12. It states sin to be a real disobedience, and the meritorious
cause of condemnation; and on this account, it is in the most perfect agreement with the
fall and with sin.
13. In every particular, it harmonizes with the nature of grace, by
ascribing to it all those things which agree with it, [or adapted to it,] and by
reconciling it most completely to the righteousness of God and to the nature and liberty
of the human will.
14. It conduces most conspicuously to declare the glory of God, his
justice and his mercy. It also represents God as the cause of all good and of our
salvation, and man as the cause of sin and of his own damnation.
15. It contributes to the honor of Jesus Christ, by placing him for
the foundation of Predestination and the meritorious as well as communicative cause of
salvation.
16. It greatly promotes the salvation of men: It is also the power,
and the very means which lead to salvation — by exciting and creating within the mind
of man sorrow on account of sin, a solicitude about his conversion, faith in Jesus Christ,
a studious desire to perform good works, and zeal in prayer — and by causing men to
work out their salvation with fear and trembling. It likewise prevents despair, as far as
such prevention is necessary.
17. It confirms and establishes that order according to which the
gospel ought to be preached,
(1.) By requiring repentance and faith —
(2.) And then by promising remission of sins, the grace of the
spirit, and life eternal.
18. It strengthens the ministry of the gospel, and renders it
profitable with respect to preaching, the administration of the sacraments and public
prayers.
19. It is the foundation of the Christian religion; because in it,
the two-fold love of God may be united together — God’s love of righteousness
[or justice], and his love of men, may, with the greatest consistency, be reconciled to
each other.
226
20. Lastly. This doctrine of Predestination, has always been
approved by the great majority of professing Christians, and even now, in these days, it
enjoys the same extensive patronage. It cannot afford any person just cause for expressing
his aversion to it; nor can it give any pretext for contention in the Christian Church.
It is therefore much to be desired, that men would proceed no
further in this matter, and would not attempt to investigate the unsearchable judgments of
God — at least that they would not proceed beyond the point at which those judgments
have been clearly revealed in the scriptures.
This, my most potent Lords, is all that I intend now to declare to
your mightinesses, respecting the doctrine of Predestination, about which there exists
such a great controversy in the Church of Christ. If it would not prove too tedious to
your Lordships, I have some other propositions which I could wish to state, because they
contribute to a full declaration of my sentiments, and tend to the same purpose as that
for which I have been ordered to attend in this place by your mightinesses.
There are certain other articles of the Christian religion, which
possess a close affinity to the doctrine of Predestination, and which are in a great
measure dependent on it: Of this description are the providence of God, the free-will of
man, the perseverance of saints, and the certainty of salvation. On these topics, if not
disagreeable to your mightinesses, I will in a brief manner relate my opinion.
II. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD
I consider Divine Providence to be "that solicitous,
continued, and universally present inspection and oversight of God, according to which he
exercises a general care over the whole world, but evinces a particular concern for all
his [intelligent] creatures without any exception, with the design of preserving and
governing them in their own essence, qualities, actions, and passions, in a manner that is
at once worthy of himself and suitable to them, to the praise of his name and the
salvation of believers. In this definition of Divine Providence, I by no means deprive it
of any particle of those properties which agree with it or belong to it; but I declare
that it preserves, regulates, governs and directs all things and that nothing
227
in the world happens fortuitously or by chance. Beside this, I
place in subjection to Divine Providence both the free-will and even the actions of a
rational creature, so that nothing can be done without the will of God, not even any of
those things which are done in opposition to it; only we must observe a distinction
between good actions and evil ones, by saying, that "God both wills and performs good
acts," but that "He only freely permits those which are evil." Still
farther than this, I very readily grant, that even all actions whatever, concerning evil,
that can possibly be devised or invented, may be attributed to Divine Providence Employing
solely one caution, "not to conclude from this concession that God is the cause of
sin." This I have testified with sufficient clearness, in a certain disputation
concerning the Righteousness and Efficacy of Divine Providence concerning things that are
evil, which was discussed at Leyden on two different occasions, as a divinity-act, at
which I presided. In that disputation, I endeavored to ascribe to God whatever actions
concerning sin I could possibly conclude from the scriptures to belong to him; and I
proceeded to such a length in my attempt, that some persons thought proper on that account
to charge me with having made God the author of sin. The same serious allegation has
likewise been often produced against me, from the pulpit, in the city of Amsterdam, on
account of those very theses; but with what show of justice such a charge was made, may be
evident to any one, from the contents of my written answer to those Thirty-one Articles
formerly mentioned, which have been falsely imputed to me, and of which this was one.
III. THE FREE-WILL OF MAN
This is my opinion concerning the free-will of man: In his
primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his creator, man was endowed with such
a portion of knowledge, holiness and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem,
consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to
him. Yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of Divine Grace.
But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to
think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be
regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by
God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to
228
understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly
good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration or renovation, I consider that,
since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing and doing that which is
good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine Grace.
IV. THE GRACE OF GOD
In reference to Divine Grace, I believe,
1. It is a gratuitous affection by which God is kindly affected
towards a miserable sinner, and according to which he, in the first place, gives his Son,
"that whosoever believers in him might have eternal life," and, afterwards, he
justifies him in Christ Jesus and for his sake, and adopts him into the right of sons,
unto salvation.
2. It is an infusion (both into the human understanding and into
the will and affections,) of all those gifts of the Holy Spirit which appertain to the
regeneration and renewing of man — such as faith, hope, charity, etc.; for, without
these gracious gifts, man is not sufficient to think, will, or do any thing that is good.
3. It is that perpetual assistance and continued aid of the Holy
Spirit, according to which He acts upon and excites to good the man who has been already
renewed, by infusing into him salutary cogitations, and by inspiring him with good
desires, that he may thus actually will whatever is good; and according to which God may
then will and work together with man, that man may perform whatever he wills.
In this manner, I ascribe to grace the commencement, the
continuance and the consummation of all good, and to such an extent do I carry its
influence, that a man, though already regenerate, can neither conceive, will, nor do any
good at all, nor resist any evil temptation, without this preventing and exciting, this
following and co-operating grace. From this statement it will clearly appear, that I by no
means do injustice to grace, by attributing, as it is reported of me, too much to
man’s free-will. For the whole controversy reduces itself to the solution of this
question, "is the grace of God a certain irresistible force?" That is, the
controversy does not relate to those actions or operations which may be ascribed to grace,
(for I
229
acknowledge and inculcate as many of these actions or operations as
any man ever did,) but it relates solely to the mode of operation, whether it be
irresistible or not. With respect to which, I believe, according to the scriptures, that
many persons resist the Holy Spirit and reject the grace that is offered.
V. THE PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS
My sentiments respecting the perseverance of the saints are, that
those persons who have been grafted into Christ by true faith, and have thus been made
partakers of his life-giving Spirit, possess sufficient powers [or strength] to fight
against Satan, sin, the world and their own flesh, and to gain the victory over these
enemies — yet not without the assistance of the grace of the same Holy Spirit. Jesus
Christ also by his Spirit assists them in all their temptations, and affords them the
ready aid of his hand; and, provided they stand prepared for the battle, implore his help,
and be not wanting to themselves, Christ preserves them from falling. So that it is not
possible for them, by any of the cunning craftiness or power of Satan, to be either
seduced or dragged out of the hands of Christ. But I think it is useful and will be quite
necessary in our first convention, [or Synod] to institute a diligent inquiry from the
Scriptures, whether it is not possible for some individuals through negligence to desert
the commencement of their existence in Christ, to cleave again to the present evil world,
to decline from the sound doctrine which was once delivered to them, to lose a good
conscience, and to cause Divine grace to be ineffectual. Though I here openly and
ingenuously affirm, I never taught that a true believer can, either totally or finally
fall away from the faith, and perish; yet I will not conceal, that there are passages of
scripture which seem to me to wear this aspect; and those answers to them which I have
been permitted to see, are not of such a kind as to approve themselves on all points to my
understanding. On the other hand, certain passages are produced for the contrary doctrine
[of unconditional perseverance] which are worthy of much consideration.
230
VI. THE ASSURANCE OF SALVATION
With regard to the certainty [or assurance] of salvation, my
opinion is, that it is possible for him who believes in Jesus Christ to be certain and
persuaded, and, if his heart condemn him not, he is now in reality assured, that he is a
son of God, and stands in the grace of Jesus Christ. Such a certainty is wrought in the
mind, as well by the action of the Holy Spirit inwardly actuating the believer and by the
fruits of faith, as from his own conscience, and the testimony of God’s Spirit
witnessing together with his conscience. I also believe, that it is possible for such a
person, with an assured confidence in the grace of God and his mercy in Christ, to depart
out of this life, and to appear before the throne of grace, without any anxious fear or
terrific dread: and yet this person should constantly pray,
"O lord, enter not into judgment with thy servant!"
But, since "God is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all
things," and since a man judges not his own self — yea, though a man know
nothing by himself, yet is he not thereby justified, but he who judgeth him is the Lord,
(1 John 3:19; 1 Corinthians 4:3,) I dare not [on this account] place this assurance [or
certainty] on an equality with that by which we know there is a God, and that Christ is
the Savior of the world. Yet it will be proper to make the extent of the boundaries of
this assurance, a subject of inquiry in our convention.
VII. THE PERFECTION OF BELIEVERS IN THIS LIFE
Beside those doctrines on which I have treated, there is now much
discussion among us respecting the perfection of believers, or regenerated persons, in
this life; and it is reported, that I entertain sentiments on this subject, which are very
improper, and nearly allied to those of the Pelagians, viz: "that it is possible for
the regenerate in this life perfectly to keep God’s precepts." To this I reply,
though these might have been my sentiments yet I ought not on this account to be
considered a Pelagian, either partly or entirely, provided I had only added that
"they could do this by the grace of Christ, and by no means without it." But
while I never asserted, that a believer could perfectly keep the precepts of Christ in
this life, I never denied it, but always left it as a matter which has still to be
decided. For I have contented myself with those sentiments which St.
231
Augustine has expressed on this subject, whose words have
frequently quoted in the University, and have usually subjoined, that I had no addition to
make to them.
Augustine says, "four questions may claim our attention on
this topic. The first is, was there ever yet a man without sin, one who from the beginning
of life to its termination never committed sin? The second, has there ever been, is there
now, or can there possibly be, an individual who does not sin, that is, who has attained
to such a state of perfection in this life as not to commit sin, but perfectly to fulfill
the law of God? The third, is it possible for a man in this life to exist without sin? The
fourth, if it be possible for a man to be without sin, why has such an individual never
yet been found?" St. Augustine says, that such a person as is described in the first
question never yet lived, or will hereafter be brought into existence, with the exception
of Jesus Christ. He does not think, that any man has attained to such perfection in this
life as is portrayed in the second question. With regard to the third, he thinks it
possible for a man to be without sin, by means of the grace of Christ and free-will. In
answer to the fourth, man does not do what it is possible for him by the grace of Christ
to perform, either because that which is good escapes his observation, or because in it he
places no part of his delight." From this quotation it is apparent, that St.
Augustine, one of the most strenuous adversaries of the Pelagian doctrine, retained this
sentiment, that "it is possible for a man to live in this world without sin."
Beside this, the same Christian father says, "let Pelagius
confess, that it is possible for man to be without sin, in no other way than by the grace
of Christ, and we will be at peace with each other." The opinion of Pelagius appeared
to St. Augustine to be this — "that man could fulfill the law of God by his own
proffer strength and ability; but with still "greater facility by means of the grace
of Christ." I have already most abundantly stated the great distance at which I stand
from such a sentiment; in addition to which I now declare, that I account this sentiment
of Pelagius to be heretical, and diametrically opposed to these words of Christ,
"Without me ye can do nothing:" (John 15:5.) It is likewise very destructive,
and inflicts a most grievous wound on the glory of Christ.
232
I cannot see that anything is contained in all I have hitherto
produced respecting my sentiments, on account of which any person ought to be "afraid
of appearing in the presence of God," and from which it might be feared that any
mischievous consequences can possibly arise. Yet because every day brings me fresh
information about reports concerning me, "that I carry in my breast destructive
sentiments and heresies," I cannot possibly conceive to what points those charges can
relate, except perhaps they draw some such pretext from my opinion concerning the Divinity
of the Son of God, and the justification of man before God. Indeed, I have lately learnt,
that there has been much public conversation, and many rumors have been circulated,
respecting my opinion on both these points of doctrine, particularly since the last
conference [between Gomarus and myself] before the Counselors of the Supreme Court. This
is one reason why I think, that I shall not be acting unadvisedly if I disclose to your
mightinesses the real state of the whole matter.
VIII. THE DIVINITY OF THE SON OF GOD
With regard to the Divinity of the Son of God and the word autoqeov
both of which have been discussed in our University in the regular form of scholastic
disputations, I cannot sufficiently wonder what the motive can be, which has created a
wish in some persons to render me suspected to other men, or to make me an object of
suspicion to themselves. This is still more wonderful, since this suspicion has not the
least ground of probability on which to rest, and is at such an immense distance from all
reason and truth, that, whatever reports have been spread abroad respecting this affair to
the prejudice of my character, they can be called nothing better than "notorious
calumnies." At a disputation held one afternoon in the University, when the thesis
that had been proposed for disputation was the Divinity of the Son of God, one of the
students happened to object, "that the Son of God was autotheos, and that he
therefore had his essence from himself and not from the Father." In reply to this I
observed, "that the word autotheos was capable of two different acceptations, since
it might signify either "one who is truly God," or "one who is God of
himself;" and that it was with great propriety and correctness attributed to the Son
of God according to the former signification, but not according to the latter." The
student, in prosecution
233
of his argument, violently contended, that the word was justly
applicable to the Son of God, principally according to the second of these significations:
and that the essence of the Father could not be said to be communicated to the Son and to
the Holy Spirit, in any other than in an improper sense; but that it was in perfect
correctness and strict propriety common alike to the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Ghost." He added "that he asserted this with the greater confidence because he
had the younger Trelcatius of pious memory, [but who was then living,] as an authority in
his favor on this point; for that learned Professor had written to the same purport in his
Common Places." To these observations I answered, "that this opinion was at
variance with the word of God, and with the whole of the ancient Church, both Greek and
Latin, which had always taught, that the Son had His Deity from the Father by eternal
generation." To these remarks I subjoined, "that from such an opinion as this,
necessarily followed the two mutually conflicting errors, Tri-theism and Sabellianism;
that is,
1. It would ensue as a necessary consequence, from these premises,
that there are three Gods, who have together and collaterally the Divine essence,
independently of this circumstance — that one of them (being only personally
distinguished from the rest) has that essence from another of the persons. Yet the
proceeding of the origin of one person from another, (that is, of the Son from the
Father,) is the only foundation that has ever been used for defending the Unity of the
Divine Essence in the Trinity of Persons.
2. It would likewise follow as another consequence, that the Son
would himself be the Father, because he would differ from the Father in nothing but in
regard to name, which was the opinion of Sabellius. For, since it is peculiar to the
Father to derive his Deity from himself, or (to speak more correctly,) to derive it from
no one, if, in the sense of being "God of himself," the Son be called autotheos,
it follows that he is the Father." Some account of this disputation was dispersed
abroad in all directions, and it reached Amsterdam. A minister of that city, who now rests
in the Lord, having interrogated me respecting the real state of this affair, I related
the whole of it to him plainly, as I have now done: and I requested him to make Trelcatius
of blessed memory acquainted with it as it had actually
234
occurred, and to advise him in a friendly manner to amend his
opinion, and to correct those inappropriate words in his Common Places: this request the
minister from Amsterdam engaged to fulfill in his own way. In all this proceeding I am far
from being liable to any blame; for I have defended the truth and the sentiments of the
Catholic and Orthodox Church. Trelcatius undoubtedly was the person most open to
animadversion; for he adopted a mode of speaking which detracted somewhat from the truth
of the matter. But such has always been either my own infelicity or the zeal of certain
individuals that, as soon as any disagreement arises, all the blame is instantly cast upon
me, as if it was impossible for me to display as much veracity [or orthodoxy] as any other
person. Yet on this subject I have Gomarus himself consenting with me; for, soon after
Trelcatius had published his common places, a disputation on the Trinity having been
proposed in the University, Gomarus did in three several parts of his theses express
himself in such terms as were diametrically opposed to those of Trelcatius. The very
obvious difference in opinion between those two Professors I pointed out to the Amsterdam
minister, who acknowledged its existence. Yet, notwithstanding all these things, no one
endeavored to vindicate me from this calumny; while great exertion was employed to frame
excuses for Trelcatius, by means of a qualified interpretation of his words, though it was
utterly impossible to reconcile their palliative explanations with the plain signification
of his unperverted expressions. Such are the effects which the partiality of favor and the
fervor of zeal can produce!
The milder and qualified interpretation put upon the words of
Trelcatius, was the following: "the Son of God may be styled autotheos, or may be
said to have his Deity from himself, in reference to his being God, although he has his
Deity from the Father, in reference to his being the Son." For the sake of a larger
explanation, it is said, "God, or the Divine Essence, may be considered both
absolutely and relatively. When regarded absolutely, the Son has his Divine essence from
himself; but, when viewed relatively, he derives it from the Father." But these are
new modes of speaking and novel opinions, and such as can by no means consist together.
For the Son, both in regard to his being the Son, and to his being God, derives his Deity
from the Father. When he is called God, it is then only not expressed that he is from the
Father; which derivation is particularly noted when the word Son
235
is employed. Indeed, the essence of God can in no manner come under
our consideration, except it be said, "that the Divine Essence is communicated to the
Son by the Father." Nor can it possibly in any different respect whatever be said,
that this essence is both "communicated to him" and "not
communicated;" because these expressions are contradictory, and can in no diverse
respect be reconciled to each other. If the Son have the Divine Essence from himself in
reference to its being absolutely considered, it cannot be communicated to him. If it be
communicated to him in reference to its being relatively considered, he cannot have it
from himself in reference to its being absolutely considered.
I shall probably be asked, "do you not acknowledge, that, to
be the Son of God, and to be God, are two things entirely distinct from each other?"
I reply, undoubtedly I subscribe to such distinction. But when those who make it proceed
still further, and say, "since to be the Son of God signifies that he derives his
essence from the Father, to be God in like manner signifies nothing less than that he has
his essence from himself or from no one;" I deny this assertion, and declare, at the
same time, that it is a great and manifest error, not only in sacred theology, but
likewise in natural philosophy. For, these two things, to be the Son and to be God, are at
perfect agreement with each other; but to derive his essence from the Father, and, at the
same time, to derive it from no one, are evidently contradictor, and mutually destructive
the one of the other.
But, to make this fallacy still more apparent, it must be observed,
how equal in force and import are certain double ternary and parallel propositions, when
standing in the following juxta-position:
God is from eternity, possessing the Divine Essence from eternity.
The Father is from no one, having the Divine Essence from no one. The Son is from the
Father, having the Divine Essence from the Father. The word "God" therefore
signifies, that He has the true Divine Essence; but the word "Son" signifies,
that he has the Divine Essence from the Father. On this account, he is correctly
denominated both God and the Son of God. But since he cannot be styled the Father, he
cannot possibly be said to have the Divine Essence from himself or from no one. Yet much
labor is devoted to the purpose of excusing these expressions, by saying,
236
"that when the son of God in reference to his being God is
said to have his essence from that form of speech signifies nothing more, than that the
Divine essence is not derived from any one." But if this be thought to be the most
proper mode of action which should be adopted, there will be no depraved or erroneous
sentiment which can be uttered that may not thus find a ready excuse. For though God and
the divine Essence do not differ substantially, yet whatever may be predicated of the
Divine Essence can by no means be equally predicated of God; because they are
distinguished from each other in our mode of framing conceptions, according to which mode
all forms of speech ought to be examined, since they are employed only with a design that
through them we should receive correct impressions. This is very obvious from the
following examples, in which we speak with perfect correctness when we say, "Deum
mortuum esse," and "the Essence of God is communicated;" but very
incorrectly when we say, "God is communicated." That man who understands the
difference existing between concrete and abstract, about which there were such frequent
disputes between us and the Lutherans will easily perceive what a number of absurdities
will ensue, if explanations of this description be once tolerated in the Church of God.
Therefore, in no way whatever can this phrase, "the Son of God is autotheos,"
["God of himself," or "in his own right,"] be excused as a correct
one, or as having been happily expressed. Nor can that be called a proper form of speech
which says, "the Essence of God is common to three persons;" but it is improper,
since the Divine Essence is declared to be communicated by one of them to another. The
observations which I now make, I wish to be particularly regarded, because it may appear
from them how much we are capable of tolerating in a man whom we do not suspect of heresy;
and, on the contrary, with what avidity we seize upon any trivial circumstance by which we
may inculpate another man whom we hold under the ban of suspicion. Of such partiality,
this incident affords two manifest examples.
IX. THE JUSTIFICATION OF MAN BEFORE GOD
I am not conscious to myself, of having taught or entertained any
other sentiments concerning the justification of man before God, than those which are held
unanimously by the Reformed and Protestant Churches, and which are in complete agreement
with their expressed opinions.
237
There was lately a short controversy in relation to this subject,
between John Piscator, Professor of Divinity in the University of Herborn in Nassau, and
the French Churches. It consisted in the determination of these two questions:
1. "is the obedience or righteousness of Christ, which is
imputed to believers and in which consists their righteousness before God, is this only
the passive obedience of Christ?" which was Piscator’s opinion. Or
2. "is it not, in addition to this, that active righteousness
of Christ which he exhibited to the law of God in the whole course of his life, and that
holiness in which he was conceived?" Which was the opinion of the French Churches.
But I never durst mingle myself with the dispute, or undertake to decide it; for I thought
it possible for the Professors of the same religion to hold different opinions on this
point from others of their brethren, without any breach of Christian peace or the unity of
faith. Similar peaceful thoughts appear to have been indulged by both the adverse parties
in this dispute; for they exercised a friendly toleration towards each other, and did not
make that a reason for mutually renouncing their fraternal concord. But concerning such an
amicable plan of adjusting differences, certain individuals in our own country are of a
different judgment.
A question has been raised from these words of the Apostle Paul:
"Faith is imputed for righteousness." (Romans 4) The inquiry was,
1. Whether those expressions ought to be properly understood,
"so that faith itself, as an act performed according to the command of the gospel, is
imputed before God for or unto righteousness — and that of grace; since it is not the
righteousness of the law."
2. Whether they ought to be figuratively and improperly understood,
"that the righteousness of Christ, being apprehended by faith, is imputed to us for
righteousness." Or
3. Whether it is to be understood "that the righteousness, for
which, or unto which, faith is imputed, is the instrumental operation of faith;"
which is asserted by some persons. In the theses on justification, which were disputed
under me when I was moderator, I have adopted the former of these opinions not in a rigid
manner, but simply, as I have likewise done in
238
another passage which I wrote in a particular letter. It is on this
ground that I am accounted to hold and to teach unsound opinions concerning the
justification of man before God. But how unfounded such a supposition is, will be very
evident at a proper season, and in a mutual conference. For the present, I will only
briefly say, "I believe that sinners are accounted righteous solely by the obedience
of Christ; and that the righteousness of Christ is the only meritorious cause on account
of which God pardons the sins of believers and reckons them as righteous as if they had
perfectly fulfilled the law. But since God imputes the righteousness of Christ to none
except believers, I conclude that, in this sense, it may be well and properly said, to a
man who believes, faith is imputed for righteousness through grace, because God hath set
forth his Son, Jesus Christ, to be a propitiation, a throne of grace, [or mercy seat]
through faith in his blood." Whatever interpretation may be put upon these
expressions, none of our Divines blames Calvin or considers him to be heterodox on this
point; yet my opinion is not so widely different from his as to prevent me from employing
the signature of my own hand in subscribing to those things which he has delivered on this
subject, in the third book of his Institutes; this I am prepared to do at any time, and to
give them my full approval. Most noble and potent Lords, these are the principal articles,
respecting which I have judged it necessary to declare my opinion before this august
meeting, in obedience to your commands.
X. THE REVISION OF THE DUTCH CONFESSION, AND THE HEIDELBERG
CATECHISM
But, besides these things, I had some annotations to make on the
Confession of the Dutch Churches and on the Heidelberg Catechism; but they will be
discussed most appropriately in our Synod, which at the first opportunity we hope to
obtain through your consent, or rather by means of your summons. This is the sole request
which I prefer to your mightinesses, that I may be permitted to offer a few brief remarks
on a certain clause, subject to which their high mightinesses, the States General, gave
their consent to the convening of a National Synod in this province, (Holland,) and the
substance of which was, that in such Synod the Confession and Catechism of the Dutch
Churches should be subjected to examination.
239
This clause has given great umbrage to many persons, not only
because they account it unnecessary, but likewise unjust, to subject the Confession and
Catechism to examination. They also suppose, that I and a certain individual of great
reputation, are the persons who prevailed with the States General to have such a clause
inserted. But it is by no means true that the revision of the Confession and Catechism is
unnecessary and unjust, or that we were the instigators of their high mightinesses in this
affair. With regard to the last of these two suppositions, so far were we from having any
concern with the origin of that clause, that, eleven or twelve years ago, at the pressing
importunity of the Churches that prayed for a National Synod, the States of South Holland
and West Friezland at last judged it proper to consent to it by their decree, on no other
condition than that in such Synod the Confession of the Dutch Churches should be subjected
to examination. Yet we, at that time, neither endeavored by our advice, nor by our
influence, to promote any such measure. But if we had with all our might made the attempt,
we should have been doing nothing but what was compatible with our official duties;
because it is obviously agreeable to reason as well as to equity, and quite necessary in
the present posture of affairs, that such a measure should be adopted.
First. That it may openly appear to all the world that we render to
the word of God alone such due and suitable honor, as to determine it to be beyond (or
rather above) all disputes, too great to be the subject of any exception, and worthy of
all acceptation.
Secondly. Because these pamphlets are writings that proceed from
men, and may, on that account, contain within them some portion of error, it is,
therefore, proper to institute a lawful inquiry, that is, in a National Synod, whether or
not there be any thing in those productions which requires amendment.
1. The first inquiry may be, whether these human writings are
accordant, in every part, with the word of God, with regard to the words themselves, the
construction of the sentences and the correct meaning.
2. Whether they contain whatever is necessary to be believed unto
salvation, so that salvation is, according to this rule, not denied to those things to
which it appertains.
240
3. Whether it [the rule of these formularies] does not contain far
too many particulars, and embrace several that are not necessary to be believed unto
salvation, so that salvation is consequently attributed to those things to which it does
not belong.
4. Whether certain words and forms of speech are not employed in
them, which are capable of being understood in different ways and furnishing occasion for
disputes. Thus, for example, in the Fourteenth article of the Confession, we read the
following words, "nothing is done without God’s ordination," [or
appointment]: if by the word "ordination" is signified, "that God appoints
things of any kind to be done," this mode of enunciation is erroneous, and it follows
as a consequence from it, that God is the author of sin. But if it signify, that
"whatever it be that is done, God ordains it to a good end," the terms in which
it is conceived are in that case correct.
5. Whether things utterly repugnant to each other may not be
discovered in them. For instance, a certain individual who is highly honored in the
Church, addressed a letter to John Piscator, Professor of Divinity in the University of
Herborn in Nassau, and in it he exhorted him to confine himself within the opinion of the
Heidelberg Catechism on the doctrine of Justification. For this purpose he cited three
passage, which he considered to be at variance with Piscator’s sentiments. But the
learned Professor replied, that he confined himself completely within the doctrinal
boundaries of the Catechism; and then quoted out of that formulary ten or eleven passages
as proofs of his sentiments. But I solemnly declare, I do not perceive by what method
these several passages can possibly be reconciled with each other.
6. Whether every thing in these writings is digested in that due
order in which the Scripture requires them to be placed.
7. Whether all things are disposed in a manner the most suitable
and convenient for preserving peace and unity with the rest of the reformed Churches.
Thirdly. The third reason is, because a National Synod is held for
the purpose of discovering whether all things in the Church are in a proper state or right
condition. One of the chief duties which appertains to such
241
an assembly, is, the examination of doctrine, whether it be that
which is admitted by unanimous consent, or that for which particular Divines contend.
Fourthly. The fourth reason is, because an examination of this
description will obtain for these writings a greater degree of authority, when after a
mature and rigid examination they shall be found to agree with the word of God, or shall
be made conformable to it in a still greater measure. Such an examination will also excite
within the minds of men a greater value for Christian ministers, when they perceive that
these sacred functionaries hold in the highest estimation that truth which is revealed in
Scripture, and that their attachment to it is so great as to induce them to spare no labor
in order to render their own doctrine more and more conformable to that revealed truth.
Fifthly. The fifth reason why at this, if at any period, it is
necessary to adopt the suggestion which we have mentioned, is,
1. Because there are several individuals in the ministry who have
certain views and considerations respecting some points contained in these writings, which
they reserve in secret and reveal to no one, because they hope that such points will
become subjects of discussion in a National Synod. Because such a convention has been
promised, some of them have suffered themselves to be persuaded not to give the least
publicity to any of the views or considerations which they have formed on these subjects.
2. Besides, this will be the design of a National Synod — That
their high mightinesses the States General may be pleased to establish and arm with public
authority certain ecclesiastical sanctions, according to which every one may be bound to
conduct himself in the Church of God. That this favor may be obtained from their high
mightinesses and that they may execute such a measure with a good conscience, it is
necessary that they be convinced in their own understandings, that the doctrine contained
in the formulary of union is agreeable to the word of God. This is a reason which ought to
induce us spontaneously to propose an examination of our Confession before their high
mightinesses, and to offer either to shew that it is in accordance with the word of God,
or to render it conformable to that Divine standard.
242
Sixthly. The sixth reason is drawn from the example of those who
are associated together under the Augustan Confession, and from the conduct of the Swiss
and the French Churches, that have within two or three years enriched their Confessions
with one entirely new article. And the Dutch Confession has itself been subjected to
examination since it was first published: some things having been taken away from it and
others added, while some of the rest have undergone various alterations.
Numerous other reasons might be produced, but I omit them; because
I consider those already mentioned to be quite sufficient for proving, that the clause
concerning examination and revision, as it is termed, was with the greatest justice and
propriety inserted in the instrument of consent of which we have made previous mention.
I am not ignorant, that other reasons are adduced, in opposition to
these; and one in particular, which is made a principal subject of public conversation,
and is accounted of all others the most solid. To it, therefore I consider it necessary to
offer a brief reply. It is thus stated: "by such an examination as this, the doctrine
of the Church will be called in question; which is neither an act of propriety nor of
duty.
"1. Because this doctrine has obtained the approbation and
suffrages of many respectable and learned men; and has been strenuously defended against
all those who have offered it any opposition.
"2. Because it has been sealed with the blood of many thousand
martyrs.
"3. Because from such an examination will arise, within the
Church, confusion, scandal, offenses, and the destruction of consciences; and, out of the
Church, ridicule, calumnies and accusations."
To all these I answer:
1. It would be much better, not to employ such odious forms of
speech, as to call in question, and others of that class, when the conversation is only
respecting some human composition, which is liable to have error intermixed with its
contents. For with what right can any writing he said to be called in question or in
doubt, which was never of itself unquestionable, or ought to be considered as indubitable?
243
2. The approbation of Divines, the defense of a composition against
its adversaries, and the sealing of it with the blood of martyrs, do not render any
doctrine authentic or place it beyond the limits of doubt: because it is possible both for
Divines and martyrs to err — a circumstance which can admit of no denial in this
argument.
3. A distinction ought to be made between the different matters
contained in the Confession. For while some of them make a near approach to the foundation
of salvation and are fundamental articles of the Christian religion, others of them are
built up as a superstructure on the foundation, and of themselves are not absolutely
necessary to salvation. The doctrines of this former class are approved by the unanimous
consent of all the Reformed, and are effectually defended against all gainsaying
adversaries. But those of the latter class become subjects of controversy between
different parties: and some of these are attacked by enemies not without some semblance of
truth and justice.
The blood of martyrs has sealed those of the former class but by no
means those of the latter. In reference to this affair, it ought to be diligently
observed, what was proposed by the martyrs of our days, and on what account they shed
their blood. If this be done, it will be found, that no man among them was even
interrogated on that subject which I consider it equitable to make a prominent part in the
deliberations of a Synod, and, therefore, that no martyr ever sealed it with his blood. I
will produce an example: when a question was raised about the meaning of the seventh
chapter of the epistle to the Romans, one individual said, "that the passage was
quoted in the margin of the Confession exactly in the same sense as he had embraced it,
and that the martyrs had with their own blood sealed this Confession." But, in reply
to this, it was stated, "that if the strictest search be instituted throughout the
entire large history of the martyrs, as it is published by the French, it will be
discovered, that no martyr has at any period been examined on that passage, or has shed
his blood on that account."
To sum up the whole: the blood of the martyrs tends to confirm this
truth, that they have made profession of their faith "in simplicity and sincerity of
conscience." But it is by no means conclusive, that the Confession which they
produced is free from every degree of reprehension or superior
244
to all exception; unless they had been led by Christ into all truth
and therefore rendered incapable of erring.
4. If the Church be properly instructed in that difference which
really does and always ought to exist between the word of God and all human writings, and
if the Church be also rightly informed concerning that liberty which she and all
Christians possess, and which they will always enjoy, to measure all human compositions by
the standard rule of God’s word, she will neither distress herself on that account,
nor will she be offended on perceiving all human writings brought to be proved at the
touch-stone of God’s word. On the contrary, she will rather feel far more abundant
delight, when she sees, that God has bestowed on her in this country such pastors and
teachers, as try at the chief touch-stone their own doctrine, in a manner at once
suitable, proper, just, and worthy of perpetual observance; and that they do this, to be
able exactly and by every possible means to express their agreement with the word of God,
and their consent to it even in the most minute particulars.
5. But it is no less proper, that the doctrine once received in the
Church should be subjected to examination, however great the fear may be "lest
disturbances should ensue, and lest evil disposed persons should make such revision an
object of ridicule, calumny or accusation," or should even turn it to their own great
advantage, [by representing the matter so as to induce a persuasion,] "that those who
propose this examination are not sufficiently confirmed in their own religion ;"
when, on the contrary, this is one of God’s commands, "search and try the
spirits whether they be of God." (1 John 4:1.) If cogitations of that description had
operated as hindrances on the minds of Luther, Zuinglius, and others, they would never
have pried into the doctrine of the Papists, or have subjected it to a scrutinizing
examination. Nor would those who adhere to the Augustan Confession have considered it
proper to submit that formulary again to a new and complete revision, and to alter it in
some particulars. This deed of theirs is an object of our praise and approval. And we
conclude, that, when Luther towards the close of his life was advised by Philip Melancthon
to bring the eucharistic controversy on the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper to some
better state of concord, (as it is related in the writings of our own countrymen,) he
acted very improperly in rejecting that counsel, and in casting it back as a reproach on
Philip, for this reason, as they state his
245
declaration, "lest by such an attempt to effect an amicable
conclusion, the whole doctrine should be called in question." Besides, if reasons of
this kind ought to be admitted, the Papists with the best right and the greatest propriety
formerly endeavored to prevent the doctrine, which had for many preceding centuries been
received in the Church, from being called in question or subjected again to examination.
But it has been suggested, in opposition to these reasons,
"that if the doctrine of the Churches be submitted to an entirely new revision as
often as a National Synod shall be held, the Church would never have any thing to which it
might adhere or on which it might fully depend, and it will be possible to declare with
great justice, concerning Churches thus circumstanced, that, they have an anniversary
faith: are tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine. (Ephesians
4:14.)
1. My first answer to these remarks, is, the Church always has
Moses and the Prophets, the Evangelists and the Apostles, that is, the Scriptures of the
Old and of the New Testament; and these Scriptures fully and clearly comprehend whatever
is necessary to salvation. Upon them the Church will lay the foundation of her faith, and
will rest upon them as on an immovable basis, principally because, how highly soever we
may esteem Confessions and Catechisms every decision on matters of faith and religion must
obtain its final resolution in the Scriptures.
2. Some points in the Confession are certain and do not admit of a
doubt: these will never be called in question by any one, except by heretics. Yet there
are other parts of its contents which are of such a kind, as may with the most obvious
utility become frequent subjects of conference and discussion between men of learning who
fear God, for the purpose of reconciling them with those indubitable articles as nearly as
is practicable. 3. Let it be attempted to make the Confession contain as few articles as
possible; and let it propose them in a very brief form, conceived entirely in the
expressions of Scripture. Let all the more ample explanations, proofs, digressions,
redundancies, amplifications and exclamations, be omitted; and let nothing be delivered in
it, except those truths which are necessary to salvation. The consequences of this brevity
will be, that the Confession will be less liable to be filled with errors, not so
obnoxious to obloquy, and less subject to examination. Let the practice of the ancient
Church be
246
produced as an example, that comprehended, in as brief a form of
words as was practicable, those articles which she judged necessary to be believed. Some
individuals form a distinction between the Confession and the Catechism with respect to
revision; and, since the Confession is the peculiar property of the Dutch Churches, and is
on that account found in the hands of comparatively few people, they conclude, "that
it is possible without any difficulty to revise it in a Synod and subject it to
examination., But since the Catechism belongs not only to us, but likewise and principally
to the Churches of the Palatinate, and is therefore to be found in the hands of all men,
the same persons consider the examination of it "to be connected with great
peril." But to this I reply, if we be desirous of constituting the Heidelberg
Catechism a formulary of concord among the teachers of the Churches, and if they be
obliged to subscribe it, it is still necessary to subject it to examination. For no
Churches whatever ought to hold such a high station in our esteem, as to induce us to
receive any writing of their composition without, at the same time, reserving to ourselves
the liberty of submitting it to a nice scrutiny. And I account this to be the principal
cause, why the Churches of different provinces, although at perfect agreement with each
other on the fundamental points of Christian doctrine, have each composed for themselves
their own Confessions. But if the Heidelberg Catechism be not allowed, to become a
formulary of this kind, and if a suitable liberty be conceded in the explanation of it, it
will not then be necessary either to revise it or subject it to examination; provided, I
repeat, that the obligatory burden of subscription be removed, and a moderate liberty be
conceded in its explanation.
This is all that I had to propose to your mightinesses, as to my
most noble, potent, wise and prudent masters. While I own myself bound to render an
account of all my actions, to the members of this most noble and potent assembly, (next
after God,) I at the same time present to them my humble and grateful acknowledgments,
because they have not disdained to grant me a courteous and patient audience. I embrace
this opportunity solemnly to declare, that I am sincerely prepared to institute an
amicable and fraternal conference with my reverend brethren, (at whatever time or place
and on whatever occasion this honorable assembly may judge proper to appoint,) on all the
topics which I have now mentioned, and on any
247
other concerning which it will be possible for a controversy to
exist, or at some future period to arise. I also make this additional promise, that I will
in every conference conduct myself with equanimity, moderation and docility, and will shew
myself not less actuated by the desire of being taught, than by that of communicating to
others some portion of instruction. And, since in the discussion of every topic on which
it will be possible to institute a conference, two points will become objects of
attention. First. "Whether that be true which is the subject of the
controversy," and, secondly, "Whether it be necessary to be believed unto
salvation," and since both these points ought to be discussed and proved out of the
Scriptures, I here tender my sacred affirmation, and solemnly bind myself hereafter to
observe it, that, however cogently I may have proved by the most solid [human] arguments
any article to be agreeable to the word of God, I will not obtrude it for an article of
belief on those of my brethren who may entertain a different opinion respecting it, unless
I have plainly proved it from the word of God and have with equal clearness established
its truth, and the necessity unto salvation that every Christian should entertain the same
belief.
If my brethren will be prepared to act in this manner, as far as I
know the complexion of my own opinions, there will not easily arise among us any schism or
controversy. But, that I may on my part remove every cause of fear that can possibly
invade this most noble assembly, occupied and engaged as its honorable members now are
with important concerns on which in a great measure depends the safety of our native
country and of the Reformed Churches, I subjoin this remark, "that to hinder my
toleration of any matters in my brethren, they must be very numerous and very important.
For I am not of the congregation of those who wish to have dominion over the faith of
another man, but am only a minister to believers, with the design of promoting in them an
increase of knowledge, truth, piety, peace and joy in Jesus Christ our Lord."
But if my brethren cannot perceive how they can possibly tolerate
me, or allow me a place among them, in reference to myself I indulge in no hope that a
schism will on this account be formed. May God avert any such catastrophe, since far too
many schisms have already arisen and spread themselves abroad among Christians. It ought
rather to be the earnest endeavor of every one, to diminish their number and destroy their
248
influence. Yet, even under such circumstances, [when I shall be
rejected from the communion of my brethren,] in patience will l possess my soul; and
though in that case I shall resign my office, yet I will continue to live for the benefit
of our common Christianity as long as it may please God to lengthen out my days and
prolong my existence. Never forgetting this sentiment, Sat Ecclesae, sat Patriae daturm,
Enough has been done to satisfy the Church of Christ and my country!
Back to top
